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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge. 
 
Sau Hung Yeung was convicted by a jury of conspiring to 
distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.S 846, 
distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) 
and (b)(1)(C), and distribution of heroin within 1000 feet of 
a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 860. Additionally, Yeung 
pleaded guilty to a separate indictment which char ged him 
with being a felon in possession of a weapon. The 
convictions were consolidated for purposes of sentencing 
and, on December 9, 1999, the District Court sentenced 
Yeung to concurrent terms of 97 months imprisonment. He 
now appeals, disputing only the amount of the her oin on 
which the District Court based his sentence. W e have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742(a), and review for clear err or the District Court's 
factual findings as to the quantity of drugs. United States v. 
Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1545 (3d Cir . 1993). For the 
reasons which follow, we will vacate the sentence and 
remand for proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Because the government has explicitly agr eed with the 
Statement of Facts set forth in Yeung's brief, we will 
replicate that recitation in full, deleting only the "Overview," 
the footnotes, and the bulk of the citations to the appendix. 
 
       The Trial Evidence 
 
        [Daryl] Nguyen became a cooperating infor mant for 
       the DEA after his own arrest for distribution of heroin 
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       in 1993. He pleaded guilty to those charges pursuant 
       to an agreement that required him to cooperate with 
       the DEA in order to obtain a reduced sentence. Nguyen 
       (hereinafter "the informant") was instructed by DEA 
       agent John Foley to see if he could buy an ounce of 
       heroin from Yeung, whom he knew as Fuk Chow Hung. 
 
        In the spring of 1994, the informant told Yeung, 
       whom he had met half a year to a year earlier , that he 
       was interested in buying heroin, and he asked for a 
       sample. On May 11, 1994, Yeung called the informant 
       and told him he had a sample. The informant met with 
       Yeung and Zheng (whom he knew as Kwai Jai) at a 
       gambling parlor in Philadelphia and told them he was 
       "interested in buying an ounce." Y eung and Zheng, 
       however, "said an ounce would not do" and that "they 
       would sell [the informant] half a unit or a unit." Yeung 
       said a unit would cost $70,000. No agreement was 
       reached for any purchase, but Yeung did give the 
       informant a very small sample of heroin wrapped in 
       plastic, which the informant later gave to DEA agent 
       John Foley. (The sample was so small that it was 
       entirely used up during the DEA field test.) 
 
        The informant had occasional contact with Yeung 
       and Zheng over the next several months, and on July 
       27, 1994, he received a page from Y eung. The 
       informant returned the page and Y eung told him to 
       come to a karaoke club at Tenth and Winter Streets to 
       pick up another sample. The informant went to the 
       karaoke club and met with Yeung and Zheng in a small 
       VIP room. Again, the informant, who was under strict 
       instructions from agent Foley to buy only one ounce, 
       told Yeung and Zheng that he only wanted one ounce. 
       Yeung said, "No can do," and repeated that he would 
       "only sell half a unit or a unit." Yeung said the price for 
       half a unit would be $40,000. Again, no agreement for 
       the purchase of heroin was reached. Zheng gave the 
       informant a sample (weighing 0.4 grams), and the 
       informant left, later turning the sample over to agent 
       Foley. 
 
        On July 29, 1994, the informant had a tape-recorded 
       phone conversation with Yeung and Zheng in which the 
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       informant said, "Hey, it's not -- it's not alright, only 
       one orange is needed." The phrase "one orange" meant 
       one ounce. Zheng replied, "It's not alright, but one 
       orange will not work," which meant that Zheng would 
       not sell him an ounce. The informant r eplied, "Hey, it's 
       not all right with you over there. He doesn't have that 
       much with him. He only want one orange." By this, the 
       informant meant that his "connection doesn't want the 
       whole unit, he only needed an ounce." 
 
        In August 1994, agent Foley gave the infor mant a 
       "drug lord car" with hidden compartments for him to 
       show to Yeung and Zheng in order to build credibility. 
       On August 26, 1994, the informant (who was wearing 
       a "body recorder") showed the car to them, claiming 
       that it belonged to the person he was buying drugs for 
       -- a "Hispanic guy." He said that the Hispanic guy 
       would take two units of heroin in another few weeks. 
       Yeung told the informant to "talk to your side clearly 
       and make sure of it," meaning that he should talk with 
       the Hispanic guy and "make sure he r eally wants it." 
       Again, no agreement was reached for the purchase of 
       heroin at any quantity or for any price. 
 
        In September 1994, in an effort to obtain the 
       telephone numbers Yeung and Zheng wer e calling, 
       agent Foley gave the informant a cell phone and 
       instructed him to sell it to Zheng for $100 as a"cloned" 
       cell phone or illegal duplicate cell phone, that would 
       supposedly be billed to some unsuspecting person. On 
       September 26, 1994, the informant met with Zheng 
       and sold him the phone. During their conversation, 
       which was taped, the informant asked if Zheng could 
       sell him two ounces. Zheng said he could not, and the 
       "units" could not be "broken down" into ounces. 
 
        During the next several weeks, the infor mant 
       continued to talk with Yeung and Zheng, and again 
       told them, as per his instructions from agent Foley, 
       that he just wanted to buy "an ounce" of her oin. 
       Finally, in a taped conversation on October 17, 1994, 
       Zheng agreed to sell him one ounce. 
 
        On October 18, 1994, the informant met Zheng in 
       Chinatown at about 1:30 p.m., and Zheng told him to 
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       wait for his phone call. The informant r eceived a page 
       later that day. He returned the page and spoke with 
       Yeung, who told him to come and get the ounce of 
       heroin at his restaurant at Broad and York. At 4:30 
       p.m., the informant drove up to the r estaurant, where 
       he saw Yeung and Zheng outside. He gave Zheng 
       $5000 (provided by the DEA) and Zheng put an ounce 
       of heroin on the floor of the informant's van. The 
       informant left and turned the her oin over to agent 
       Foley. 
 
        The informant made no other purchases of heroin 
       from Yeung and Zheng, and there wer e no negotiations 
       or even discussions for any other purchases. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 4-8. 
 
As noted above, Yeung complains only of the amount of 
heroin the District Court tarred him with at sentencing. 
Again, the government agrees with Y eung's recitation of 
how that sentence came to be and, again, we r eplicate it in 
full: 
 
       The Sentencing 
 
        Defense counsel objected at sentencing to the base 
       offense level in the presentence r eport ("PSR") on the 
       ground that it was based on the one "unit" quantity of 
       heroin, instead of the one ounce quantity actually sold. 
       One "unit," which weighs 1-1/2 pounds, or 680 grams, 
       is within the 400 to 700 gram range requir ed for level 
       28. One ounce of heroin, or 29 grams, is within the 20 
       to 40 gram range required for level 18. Defense counsel 
       argued that there never was an agr eement to sell a unit 
       to the informant, and that under Application Note 12 
       to U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1, the amount actually sold"more 
       accurately reflects the scale of the of fense." (App. 
       320a). The court overruled defense counsel's objection, 
       stating: 
 
       I find that the evidence shows that [ther e was] a 
       conspiracy by the defendants to sell a unit and then 
       later half of a unit and therefore, that the probation 
       office has calculated the amount of drugs corr ectly. 
 
       (App. 333a). 
 
                                5 
  
        Mr. Yeung's guidelines wer e thus calculated starting 
       with a base offense level of 28. One point was added 
       because the sale of the heroin took place within 1000 
       feet of a school. The total offense level was therefore 
       29, and in criminal history category "II," the guideline 
       range was 97 to 121 months. The gun possession 
       charge had a base offense level of 14, and under the 
       Multiple Count provisions of U.S.S.G. S 3D1.4, this 
       offense, being more than 8 levels lower than the level 
       for the drug offense, did not have any ef fect on the 
       total offense level. 
 
        Had Mr. Yeung's sentence been based on the one 
       ounce quantity of heroin actually sold, his of fense level 
       would have been 18 plus 1, or 19. Under the Multiple 
       Count provision of U.S.S.G. S 3D1.4, the gun 
       possession charge (being 5 levels lower than the offense 
       level for the drug charge) would have r equired a one 
       level increase, bringing the total combined of fense level 
       to 20. In criminal history category II, the guideline 
       range would have been 37 to 46 months. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 8-10. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
At the outset, it bears mention that this is an unusual 
case in that courts typically see agreements or conspiracies 
between prospective sellers and buyers of drugs and not, as 
here, an agreement only between sellers. This case is also 
complicated by the fact that although Yeung and Zheng 
would have liked to sell and presumably would have sold 
Nguyen one unit or one-half unit or even two units, they 
never negotiated for more than one ounce because Nguyen 
simply dug in his heels. It is, of course, crystal clear that 
the unusual or complicated nature of this case is only such 
for purposes of sentencing. Yeung was pr operly convicted of 
conspiring with Zheng to distribute heroin-- the amount of 
heroin, as long as it is a measurable amount, is irrelevant 
to the conspiracy charge -- and Yeung does not argue 
otherwise. 
 
The question before this Court, therefor e, is exceedingly 
narrow: whether Application Note 12 to U.S.S.G.S 2D1.1 
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counsels that Yeung be sentenced to the one ounce 
completed transaction, the one unit (or one-half unit or two 
units) that he and Zheng would have liked to have sold to 
Nguyen, or the aggregated amount of one unit (or one-half 
unit or two units) plus one ounce. The District Court 
sentenced appellant based on one unit which, after the 
appropriate adjustments were made, placed Yeung in a 
guideline range of 97-121 months. 
 
Section 2D1.1 establishes the base offense level for 
defendants who agree or conspire to sell drugs, based upon 
the quantity of drugs involved. Application Note 12 to 
S 2D1.1 sets forth the method by which the appropriate 
quantity of drugs is determined if the of fense involves 
negotiation to traffic in drugs. While the parties do not 
dispute the applicability of Application Note 12, they 
disagree on how it should be applied her e. Yeung argues 
that the plain meaning of Application Note 12, when 
applied to the facts of this case, mandates that he should 
have been sentenced within the 36 to 46 month range for 
the one ounce completed transaction. The gover nment 
argued at sentencing that the measure of drugs should be 
one unit and argues before us that the sentence of 97 
months should be affirmed although it initially assumed, 
wrongly it now concedes, that the District Court aggregated 
the one unit and one ounce and continues to ar gue, again 
wrongly, that aggregation is appropriate although, were 
that the case, the sentence would be higher than the 
sentence which it seeks to affirm.1 Who is right and who is 
wrong is, as should be obvious, of great significance to 
Yeung in terms of the time he is r equired to serve. 
 
Yeung is right. Prior to November 1, 1995, Application 
Note 12 stated: "In an offense involving negotiation to traffic 
in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in 
an uncompleted distribution shall be used to calculate the 
applicable amount." U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1, comment. (n.12) 
(1992) (formerly S 2D1.4, comment. (n.1)). Notably, this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Parenthetically, and without more ado, we dispose of the government's 
aggregation argument because it is based on the premise that the one 
ounce distribution was merely a "prelude" to an anticipated one unit 
transaction. There is no evidence to support this premise. 
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prior version was silent as to the amount of drugs to be 
considered in a completed transaction, as we have here. For 
that reason alone, we note, pre-amendment completed 
transaction cases are not terribly instructive. 
 
Effective November 1, 1995, Amendment 518 to the 
Guidelines deleted the language of then-Application Note 12 
and inserted, as we put it, "a new set of instructions in its 
place." United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 490 (3d 
Cir. 1998).2 Although we found in Marmolejos that the 
amendment merely clarified S 2D1.1 rather than effecting a 
substantive change, the amendment was nonetheless 
significant given that "Application Note 12 now specifies 
that the actual weight delivered, rather than the weight 
under negotiation, should be used for calculating a 
defendant's sentence if the sale was completed." 
Marmolejos, 140 F.3d at 491. Mor eover, it is quite clear 
from the language of amended Application Note 12 that 
when a sale is completed, the amount deliver ed will 
typically "more accurately reflect[ ] the scale of the offense" 
unless a "further delivery" is "scheduled" or at the very 
least is "agreed-upon." No further delivery was scheduled -- 
or agreed upon -- here. 
 
In the Commission's words, and as relevant here, 
Amendment 518 "revises the Commentary toS 2D1.1 to 
provide that in a case involving negotiation for a quantity of 
a controlled substance, the negotiated quantity is used to 
determine the offense level unless the completed 
transaction establishes a different quantity . . . ." U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C at 344 (1997). 
Application Note 12, as amended, itself reads, in relevant 
part: 
 
       In an offense involving an agreement to sell a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. An application note must be given "contr olling weight unless it is 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the r egulation." United States v. 
Miller, 224 F.3d 247, 253, n.8 (3d Cir . 2000). Although Yeung's conduct 
occurred in 1994, the District Court corr ectly used the Guidelines 
Manual in effect at sentencing because the 1995 amendment to 
Application Note 12 did not violate the ex post facto clause of the 
Constitution but merely clarified section 2D1.1. See U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.11(b)(1); United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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       controlled substance, the agreed-upon quantity of the 
       controlled substance shall be used to deter mine the 
       offense level unless the sale is completed and the 
       amount delivered more accurately r eflects the scale of 
       the offense. For example, a defendant agr ees to sell 
       500 grams of cocaine, the transaction is completed by 
       the delivery of the controlled substance -- actually 480 
       grams of cocaine, and no further delivery is scheduled. 
       In this example, the amount delivered mor e accurately 
       reflects the scale of the offense. 
 
Marmolejos and Application Note 12 str ongly suggest, if 
not require, that if a defendant is to be tarred for 
sentencing purposes with a larger quantity than was 
delivered, that quantity must have been negotiated or 
agreed upon prior to the delivery -- the partial delivery was, 
in effect, a down payment. Here, no quantity was ever 
"negotiated" between Yeung and/or Zheng and Nguyen 
beyond the agreed-upon one ounce. Moreover , phrases 
such as "weight under negotiation," which we used in 
Marmolejos, and "negotiated quantity," which the 
Commission used in describing the amendment, suggest, if 
not require, an agreement between buyer and seller, with 
the atypical nature of this case thus r earing its head. 
Certainly, if Application Note 12 were to be r estricted to 
buyer-seller negotiations and deliveries, and putting aside 
Nguyen's informant status and the fact that it is not any 
agreement with him that is pressed, the one ounce clearly 
"accurately reflects the scale of the of fense." 
 
While there is a paucity of case law construing 
Application Note 12, as amended, at least one case leaves 
little doubt that a seller-seller agreement will do for 
purposes of sentencing one or both of the sellers. See 
United States v. Gomes, 177 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 1999). In that 
case, factually similar in some respects but factually 
dissimilar in one critical respect, the Court, citing only pre- 
amendment case law and recognizing that the language of 
Application Note 12 "still needs refinement," upheld the 
District Court which found that the kilo intended to be sold 
and not the ounce actually delivered "mor e accurately 
reflects the scale of the offense." See Gomes, 177 F.3d at 
85. 
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Separate and apart from the other distinctions Yeung 
would draw between that case and this, in Gomes , while no 
sale beyond the sale of a one ounce sample was made,"the 
evidence permitted the District Court to find that 
[defendant] Quadros had arranged with[co-defendant] 
Aguiar to make the sale of a kilo or had aided and abetted 
Aguiar's effort to make such a sale" i.e. a "further delivery 
[was] scheduled," or "agreed-upon," to use the phrases used 
in Application Note 12. Id. at 84. Indeed, the fact that the 
sale was of a "sample" was itself a harbinger of a larger 
transaction to follow. Here, of course, ther e is no evidence 
that a "further delivery" was negotiated, much less 
"scheduled" or "agreed-upon." Between October 18, 1994, 
when the one ounce distribution was made, and November 
19, 1998, when Yeung was arrested, ther e is no evidence 
that any further delivery was even discussed by Y eung 
and/or Zheng and Nguyen and at no time befor e October 
18, 1994 was there an agreement even between Yeung and 
Zheng that beyond the one ounce, a sale of an amount 
certain was "arranged." The very predicate for the Gomes 
conclusion fails. 
 
United States v. Felix, which appears to be another seller- 
seller conspiracy, supports the result we r each here. See 
United States v. Felix, 87 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1996). In 
Felix, the co-conspirators had agreed to pr ovide a larger 
amount of cocaine than was, in fact, deliver ed. The Ninth 
Circuit found that, under amended Application Note 12, the 
District Court erred by not sentencing the co-conspirators 
for the lesser amount of cocaine actually deliver ed rather 
than the amount they had agreed to provide because the 
sale was complete with no further delivery contemplated 
and, therefore, the actual delivery mor e accurately reflected 
the scale of the offense than the earlier pr omised larger 
amount. 
 
The District Court in this case similarly err ed when it 
ruled that "the evidence shows . . . a conspiracy by the 
defendants to sell a unit and then later a half of a unit and 
therefore, that the probation office has calculated the 
amount of the drugs correctly." 333a. While, as a matter of 
conspiracy law, Yeung and Zheng certainly conspired to sell 
drugs, as a matter of sentencing law the quantity of drugs 
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found was clearly erroneous. Moreover , we note, the 
probation officer arrived at the base of fense level for one 
unit (or one-half unit) for a different r eason than the 
District Court, finding that "During the conversations 
between [Yeung] and [Nguyen] they discussed the sales" of 
those quantities. See Addendum to PSR. Mer e discussions, 
whether between buyer and seller or seller and seller, are 
hardly enough and, certainly, will not carry the day when 
they preceded the only transaction which was, in fact, 
negotiated and the agreement as to which was the 
culmination of any discussions over quantity. 
 
One final note. Contrary to what the dissent says, we do 
not base our conclusion on the fact that Yeung never 
"negotiated" with Nguyen in what was, after all, a 
seller/seller conspiracy to sell more than an ounce. In any 
event, repeated but continually rejected offers to sell 
varying amounts do not negotiations make. And, of course, 
Yeung and Zheng, the two sellers, did not and virtually by 
definition could not negotiate with each other . Neither do 
we base our conclusion on any reading of Application Note 
12 which would require that a futur e drug delivery must be 
"scheduled" if "scheduled" is only narr owly defined, as the 
dissent apparently defines it, as a futur e transaction 
specific as to time and place. Rather, we base our 
conclusion on the fact, and fact it be, that ther e was 
insufficient evidence to show an agreement to sell -- and 
certainly, there was no agreement to buy-- beyond the one 
ounce. 
 
Although determining the appropriate drug quantity for 
sentencing purposes is not a precise exer cise, before 
sentencing a defendant for more than he or she actually 
delivered, Application Note 12 requir es, at minimum, 
evidence of an agreement as to the quantity to be sold in 
the future, even as between two sellers. Stated somewhat 
differently, once a delivery is made and there is insufficient 
evidence to show that that delivery was merely a prelude to 
a larger "scheduled" or "agreed-upon" deal, the amount 
delivered will control for sentencing purposes. Yeung was 
sentenced based on one of several quantities bandied about 
by he and Zheng even though the only evidence of an 
agreement of any kind was the one ounce actually sold. 
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Had there been evidence of an agreement beyond that one 
ounce, it would have been eminently appropriate for Yeung 
to receive the sentence he received. Because, however, it is 
only the one ounce which is supported by the evidence, it 
is on that amount that Yeung must be r esentenced. 
 
We will vacate the sentence and remand for proceedings 
in accordance with this opinion.3  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Yeung, somewhat in passing, invokes Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 
S.Ct. 2348 (2000). Given that the sentence imposed was not beyond the 
statutory maximum, we do not see the applicability of Apprendi to this 
case. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
The majority has done a masterful job of trying to make 
sense of a guideline provision, which, in the context of 
these facts, is counterintuitive at best, and is penologically 
nonsensical at worst. As explained by the majority, Section 
2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines establishes the base 
level offense for defendants who agree or conspire to sell 
narcotics, based upon the quantity of drugs involved. 
Application Note 12 to S 2D1.1 addresses the method for 
determining the appropriate quantity. Specifically, it 
requires that the agreed-upon quantity of a controlled 
substance shall be used to determine the of fense level 
unless the sale is completed and the amount delivered more 
accurately reflects the scale of the of fense. See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL S 2D1.1, cmt. n.12 
(1998). 
 
Although not explicitly addressed by Application Note 12, 
I agree with the majority that a seller/seller agreement is 
sufficient to meet this test. We diver ge, however, thereafter. 
According to the majority, the District Court erred by 
holding that a seller/seller agreement was consummated 
that more accurately reflected the scale of the offense. I 
disagree. I believe that although Yeung and Zheng only sold 
and delivered an ounce, they agreed  to sell the unit. 
Further, I believe the District Court pr operly exercised its 
discretion in holding that the unit mor e accurately 
measured the scale of the offense. Because I conclude that 
Yeung's sentence should instead reflect the unit (680 
grams) of drugs that he repeatedly offer ed to Nguyen, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
It is undisputed that Yeung and Zheng wanted to sell a 
unit of drugs to Nguyen. Accordingly, the first question is 
whether this unit was the amount negotiated or agr eed 
upon. If so, we must determine whether this unit more 
accurately reflects the scale of the of fense than the amount 
delivered. The majority concludes that Y eung and Zheng 
never agreed to sell a unit, that Nguyen never agreed to buy 
a unit, and that the ounce Yeung deliver ed, rather than the 
unit he wanted to sell, more accurately r eflects the scale of 
his offense. In arriving at this conclusion, the majority 
holds that Application Note 12 requires a further scheduled 
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drug delivery or, at the very least, an agr eement to deliver 
more drugs before a sentencing court can consider a 
negotiated drug quantity to measure the scale of an offense. 
Maj. Op. at 8. 
 
According to the majority, rejected but r epeated offers do 
not constitute negotiations.1 Instead, the seller and buyer 
must schedule a further delivery of a specified quantity of 
drugs. Maj. Op. at 6, 8-11. Therefore, because Nguyen 
resisted Yeung's attempts to sell mor e than one ounce and 
never scheduled any further deliveries, the majority 
concludes that there is insufficient evidence to show an 
agreement to sell the unit. In my view, this interpretation 
and application of Note 12 is incorrect and r eflects neither 
the gravity of the offense nor the culpability of the 
appellant. 
 
I note first that the plain language of Application Note 12 
does not require a scheduled futur e delivery in order for a 
quantity of drugs to be considered "negotiated or agreed 
upon." Nor does Application Note 12 requir e scheduled 
future deliveries to use a negotiated or agr eed upon 
quantity of drugs, instead of the amount deliver ed, to 
measure the offense level. In one of its examples, 
Application Note 12 simply notes that a lack of further 
deliveries is a factor to consider. It states: "a defendant 
agrees to sell 500 grams of cocaine, the transaction is 
completed by delivery of the controlled substance-actually 
480 grams of cocaine, and no further delivery is scheduled. 
In this example, the amount delivered mor e accurately 
reflects the scale of the offense." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL S 2D1.1, cmt. n.12 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 
Although this example suggests that a future scheduled 
delivery is germane to an offense level determination, it is 
not an absolute requirement nor does it control every 
factual scenario. The facts of the present case are 
distinguishable from the example and, ther efore, the lack of 
scheduled future delivery is neither contr olling nor even 
helpful. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This approach would likely surprise labor negotiators, who often 
negotiate for extended periods of time and make hundreds of offers 
before a contract is executed. 
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In the Application Note's example, the defendant 
controlled the amount delivered. The defendant ultimately 
delivered a smaller amount based upon his own decision. 
Here, however, the amount deliver ed clearly does not reflect 
Yeung's and Zheng's intent because they did not control the 
amount delivered. Instead, the amount was contr olled by 
the informant and reflects his pur chasing limitations. 
Yeung and Zheng sold one ounce only because the 
informant refused to buy more. It had nothing to do with 
Yeung's and Zheng's intention, capability, or agreement to 
sell more. The record reveals that Yeung and Zheng not 
only repeatedly offered to sell the entire unit, but 
continually insisted upon doing so. Had the infor mant 
wanted to purchase more, Yeung and Zheng would have 
sold it to him. 
 
For example, during their first meeting, Y eung and Zheng 
told Nguyen that they would only sell unit and half-unit 
quantities; therefore, "an ounce would not do." Appellant's 
Br. at 4-5. In short, Yeung and Zheng were insistent, ready, 
willing, and able to sell the unit of drugs. This conduct 
amounts to more than "mere discussions" as the majority 
contends. It constitutes an agreement between Y eung and 
Zheng to sell the unit of drugs, despite Nguyen's r esistance 
and his resulting refusal to accept a lar ger amount or 
schedule future purchases. Although this agreement did 
not involve a buyer, it is an agreement nonetheless. 
Accordingly, I believe that Yeung's and Zheng's attempts to 
sell the unit were negotiations, that their obvious desire to 
sell the larger amount is incontrovertible evidence of an 
agreement, and that the unit that they agr eed to sell more 
accurately reflects the scale of Yeung's offense, even in the 
absence of a plan for future delivery. 
 
United States v. Gomes, 177 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir. 1999), 
supports my position. In Gomes, the Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit reviewed the District Court's determination 
that a defendant charged with conspiracy and two counts 
of distribution was responsible for one kilogram of cocaine. 
The defendant had arranged a sale with a buyer , who was 
an undercover agent with the Drug Enfor cement 
Administration. Before the meeting, the defendant advised 
the seller that the potential buyer wanted a kilogram of 
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cocaine. At the meeting, however, the buyer surprised the 
defendant and seller by requesting a one ounce sample 
before buying the kilogram; he assured them that if it was 
good, he would contact them. No later sale was made, 
however. Nonetheless, the District Court found that the 
defendant arranged and aided and abetted a sale of a 
kilogram of cocaine. See Gomes, 177 F .3d at 84. 
 
The Court of Appeals began its review of the District 
Court's holding with the language of Application Note 12. It 
noted, as I believe, that the language was not absolute. It 
did not require courts always to use the amount delivered. 
See id. at 85. Rather, it established a presumption that the 
agreed upon amount governed "unless" a sale occurred and 
the quantity sold more accurately reflected the scale of the 
offense. See id. Moreover , the Note's example, in which a 
defendant, who agrees to sell 500 grams but then delivers 
only 480 grams, was responsible for only 480 grams is not 
a "universal requirement." The example involved similar 
amounts and a defendant, rather than a buyer , who 
decided to deliver less than promised. In addition, the 
example did not involve a defendant who, like Y eung, 
"independently conspir[ed] with or aid[ed] an accomplice in 
the sale." Accordingly, the Court held that because the 
defendant conspired to sell a kilogram and yet failed only 
because the buyer refused to accept the full amount, the 
kilogram and not the ounce actually delivered"more 
accurately reflect[ed] the scale of the offense." Id. at 85. 
 
The Gomes court stressed that the buyer rather than the 
defendant controlled the amount of drugs sold. As in the 
present case, the defendant and the seller would have sold 
a larger amount if not for the buyer's r esistance. The only 
"plan" for a "future delivery" in Gomes was the buyer's 
assurance that he would contact the seller for mor e cocaine 
if it was "good." In essence, the agreement in Gomes is the 
same as the one in this case. The defendant in Gomes 
agreed and arranged to make a sale of a kilogram of drugs 
(the larger amount) just as Yeung and Zheng agreed and 
attempted to arrange a sale of the unit. As such, the 
majority's attempt to distinguish Gomes fr om the present 
case is misplaced. 
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Finally, I would like to note that in my view, we should 
review the District Court's decision (that the quantity 
agreed upon rather than delivered "mor e accurately reflects 
the scale of the offense") for an abuse of discretion. The 
majority does not reach this issue because it concludes 
that the agreed upon amount and the amount delivered 
were the same. However, because I believe there was an 
agreement to deliver a greater quantity, I must necessarily 
discuss our standard of review. 
 
Our review under an abuse of discretion standard is 
quite narrow. A finding of abuse is appr opriate only where 
the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or 
when improper standards, criteria, or pr ocedures are used." 
Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 378-79 (3d Cir. 1977). 
Stated differently, discretion is abused only where "no 
reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial 
court." Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & 
Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 115 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 
With this deferential standard in mind, it can hardly be 
said that the District Court abused its discr etion in 
concluding that the unit that Yeung and Zheng agreed to 
sell, rather than the ounce they delivered, mor e accurately 
reflects Yeung's culpability and hence the scale of his 
offense. The record overwhelmingly supports the District 
Court's conclusion. As noted above, Yeung wanted and was 
fully prepared to sell the full unit. The fact that he only sold 
the ounce had nothing to do with his intentions or 
capability. Rather, the informant limited the amount 
delivered and bought. Therefore, Y eung should be held 
responsible for the larger amount since this is the amount 
he intended to sell. To hold otherwise would ignore this 
reality, and essentially allow an infor mant's limitations to 
dictate the culpability of a defendant -- an outcome that 
belies common sense and could not have been intended by 
the Sentencing Commission. 
 
In sum, I disagree with the majority's interpr etation of 
Application Note 12. I believe that the District Court's 
sentence was a proper exercise of its discretion, and would 
affirm its judgment. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
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